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MOST SECRET.

COPY NO. 20

W.M. (40) 10th CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 1.

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX.

SCANDINAVIA.

The War Cabinet had before them the following

(Previous Reference: papers:-

W.M. (40) 9th Conclusions, Minute 5).

- (a) A Memorandum prepared in the War Office relating to the arrangements for the despatch of forces to Norwegian ports (W.P. (40) 13).
- (b) A Report by the Chiefs of Staff expressing the opinion that the chances of a successful seizure of the mines in northern Sweden and/or the port of Lulea by German parachute troops were so slight as to be negligible (W.P. (40) 15).

THE PRIME MINISTER referred briefly to the two Papers before the War Cabinet, and invited the Foreign Secretary to give an account of the talk which he had had with M. Wallenberg the previous day.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS gave an account of the discussion, at which Mr. Cross had been present. He (the Foreign Secretary) had started by outlining our case for action. He had asked M. Wallenberg if he could explain the reasons for the rather surprising attitude adopted by the Swedish Government. It was clear from M. Wallenberg's reply that his Government were concerned with the following points:-

First, the Swedes thought that the prospects of German reaction against Sweden were likely to cause them extreme difficulty. They thought that the Germans would proceed further with the campaign against Swedish trade, and would take action within Swedish territorial waters, and that this would lead to very dangerous consequences.

The Foreign Secretary had replied that he did not see how it would be in Germany's interest to pick a quarrel with Sweden and risk losing all the Swedish ore. This reply, however, had only partially reassured M. Wallenberg.

Secondly, M. Wallenberg thought that if these disturbing results followed British action in Norwegian territorial waters, the effect on Swedish opinion would be profound. At the present moment Swedish opinion was overwhelmingly pro-Ally; say 80 or 90 per cent. Swedish public opinion was, however, quite ignorant as to the German violation of Norwegian territorial waters, and he did not think that the three cases which we had cited (two of which were challenged by Norway), would be regarded as adequate justification for our proposed action. Swedish public opinion would be more influenced by the Norwegian view than by our view of the case, and would blame us for all the consequences that ensued. Such a result would be seriously damaging to the Allied cause - a consequence which he, who was strongly pro-British, would greatly deplore.

The third point made by M. Wallenberg was that Sweden had given, and was giving, a great deal of material help to Finland - in some cases up to 20 or 30 per cent. of her own equipment. From the point of view both of Sweden herself and of Finland, it was vital that Sweden's re-armament should not be interrupted. At the present time Germany was replacing in Sweden the arms which Sweden was supplying to Finland. He doubted whether this country would be in a position to do much in the immediate future in the way of supplying arms to Sweden.

If the re-armament of Sweden by Germany was made impossible by outside action, Sweden's ability to help Finland might be gravely affected, if not destroyed, and public opinion in Sweden would feel that Sweden had been stabbed in the back in their struggle against Russia.

M. Wallenberg had emphasised that the effort now being made by Finland (and Sweden) against Russia was in the interests of the Allies. If Russia could be held back, there was always a possibility that serious internal trouble would start, which would be helpful to both countries.

All that we should gain by the action was likely to result in all these unfortunate consequences was the stoppage of the import to Germany of  $\frac{3}{4}$  million or a million tons of ore. The Swedish Government felt that the disadvantages altogether outweighed the advantages likely to be secured.

M. Wallenberg had added that one element which would help to swing public opinion against us would be the feeling that we were searching for a pretext for stopping the ore. To this the Foreign Secretary said that he had replied that we certainly did want to stop the ore, but that in our view the pretext was a substantial one.

[Incidentally M. Wallenberg had explained what the Swedish Trade Delegates had meant when they said they assumed that we should "look after Narvik". They had thought it impossible for ships to move the whole way along the coast without leaving territorial waters and thus giving us a chance to intercept them. Unfortunately this was not the case.]

The Foreign Secretary had then asked M. Wallenberg whether he had any suggestion to make to deal with the situation. He had told M. Wallenberg that we had two objects: first, to damage Germany as much as possible; and, secondly, to help Sweden and Finland against Russia.

M. Wallenberg had argued that these two objects conflicted. The Foreign Secretary had asked whether this could be assumed to be so. In this connection he

had emphasised the significance of the Germany Military Mission to Moscow, and he had reminded M. Wallenberg of our diplomatic démarche, when we had offered help to Sweden if she was involved in trouble as the result of giving help to Finland. In the Spring the Russians might again be threatening to advance through Finland. For that reason, or for some other reason, the Germans might feel that they must take action to make certain of obtaining control over the northern ironfield. This might happen irrespective of any action which we took at the present time in regard to the Narvik traffic. Would it not be wise that Sweden should examine these ultimate issues in consultation with this country?

M. Wallenberg had not expressed much surprise at this statement, but had asked whether in fact we could do much to help Sweden in this event. To this the Foreign Secretary had replied that he thought we should be prepared to help, but that obviously help, to be fully effective, must be concerted in advance.

M. Wallenberg had then said that he had no authority to speak on this subject, and he did not know whether his Government had considered it. But his general reaction to the suggestion was by no means bad.

M. Wallenberg had then pressed for favourable consideration of various Swedish requests for the supply of military equipment for the Swedish forces on which he had been referred to the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence and the Service Ministers. He had made no offer in regard to the reduction of supplies of ore through the Baltic.

Later in the evening, M. Wallenberg had returned to the Foreign Office and had said that he doubted whether any record of his conversation with the Foreign Secretary could show how depressed he and the Swedish Government felt at this turn of events. Some time ago they had expected some such action on our part; but the whole situation was now changed by the Finnish war, and he looked upon it with a very different eye.

Continuing, the Foreign Secretary expressed the hope that the War Cabinet would now be able to take a definite decision on the whole question. Up till now he had felt that it was possible to deal with the Narvik project in isolation. But the real question was the possibility of carrying through the larger project. For this the co-operation of the Scandinavian countries, and in particular of Sweden, was essential. The pros and cons of taking action against the Narvik traffic were very finely balanced, and although he himself had felt grave doubts as to the wisdom of such action he had not felt the objections were sufficiently strong to set against the general opinion of the War Cabinet. His conversation with M. Wallenberg, however, had definitely weighted the balance of his judgment against the Narvik project. The new factors were, first, the probability of an adverse effect on Swedish public opinion, second, the possible effect on Sweden's capacity to give support to Finland, and third, the ~~apparent probability~~ <sup>possibility - he did not put it higher-</sup> that we might be able to open negotiations with Sweden and bring her round to our side without taking forcible measures. Bearing these factors in mind he felt that the Narvik project by itself was not worth the risk involved to the success of the larger project. The decision with which we were faced was a very difficult one, but the penalties for a mistake would be very much heavier if we had stopped the Narvik traffic than if we refrained, since in the latter case we at least should not have prejudiced the chance of success in the larger project.

An alternative course which he would wish to re-examine  
~~The course which we now favoured was to send~~  
 the Lord Privy Seal, or some other Minister, to Sweden  
 to explore the possibilities of bringing the Swedes round  
 to our side. We could keep the threat of action against  
 the Narvik traffic in reserve to strengthen our hands  
 against the Swedes, but our main objective of stopping  
 all the ore going to Germany was so important that in his  
 opinion we should be extremely careful before we took a  
 hasty step which might prove a false one.

At the request of the Prime Minister the CHIEF  
 OF THE AIR STAFF gave the views of the Chiefs of Staff.  
 He said that they wished to emphasise four points, and  
 they fully realised that to a large extent political  
 considerations rather than military were at issue. These  
 four points were:-

- (i) If there was any chance that action against  
 the Narvik traffic would prejudice the  
 success of the bigger project, they doubted  
 the value of the Narvik project from the  
 military point of view. They were dis-  
 posed to think that the action proposed  
 might militate against the chances of the  
 big project, though this was, of course,  
 primarily a political question.
- (ii) The active co-operation of Norway and  
 Sweden was essential for the success of the  
 larger project.
- (iii) There was a possibility that action against  
 the Narvik traffic would so alarm the  
 Germans that they would sabotage the  
 Narvik-Galivare railway. Sabotage of this  
 railway would be possible for the Germans  
 if they were really determined to carry it  
 out. The line ran through lonely country,  
 and it was impossible to guard it every-  
 where. Once the railway was cut we could  
 not send a force to the Galivare fields.
- (iv) Action in Scandinavia might develop into a  
 very large commitment, and would in any  
 event involve the diversion of forces from  
 France, which for us was the decisive front.

Generally speaking, the Chiefs of Staff felt  
 some apprehension at the prospect of forcible action  
 against the Narvik traffic.

THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF said that he had discussed the matter with General Gamelin during his recent visit. General Gamelin had agreed that the invasion of Scandinavia would represent a big project for Germany and would constitute a big commitment for them. He had also agreed that on general grounds a campaign in Scandinavia would be a better diversion from our point of view than in the Balkans. On the other hand General Gamelin had insisted that the Western Front must be secure, and had urged that we should not in any way reduce the number of the forces which we sent to France. He had, however, accepted the argument that if we despatched forces to Scandinavia this could only be done at the cost of delaying the despatch of additional forces to France.

General Gamelin had been in favour of putting a force into the northern ironfield, and was preparing Alpine troops for the purpose. He also thought that, if we sent forces to Northern Sweden we should be called upon to send help to meet the contingency of a German invasion of the southern part of the country.

Continuing, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that his own personal opinion was that a diversion in Scandinavia would be sound strategically, and would probably rule out the possibility of offensives elsewhere on any scale by either the Germans or the Russians.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY said that discussion of this subject had now been proceeding for six weeks and every argument had been brought forward in favour of doing nothing toward the stoppage of

the Narvik traffic. He saw no reason at all why the Swedes should ever willingly allow us to go through with the big project. If we held our hand now, they would realise that they had only to protest and we should draw back once again. It was not right that we should bear the whole burden of fighting the Germans on behalf of the small neutral countries while they did nothing to help us. We should brace ourselves to accept the hazards of action, otherwise Germany would go on getting her ore indefinitely without interruption.

He was not impatient for action merely for action's sake, but ever since the beginning of the war we had let the initiative rest with Germany. We waited for her to develop each form of attack against us, and contented ourselves merely with devising means of meeting these attacks as they arose. If, however, we opened up a new theatre of operations in Scandinavia, we had a fine chance of forcing Germany into situations which she had not foreseen, and of seizing the initiative for ourselves.

THE PRIME MINISTER read to the War Cabinet a telegram which he had just received from the Prime Minister of Australia.

Mr. Menzies earnestly requested, in view of the possible repercussions of any decision to take action in Norwegian territorial waters, that such a decision should not be taken until the Dominions had had an opportunity to express their views. He asked that he should be fully informed of the arguments in favour of and against the proposed action, and that he should be given a summary of the Chiefs of Staff's appreciation of the assistance that

could be rendered to the Scandinavian countries in the event of the proposed action leading to an attack on them by Germany. He concluded by expressing the opinion that the suggested action would have a bad effect in neutral countries and would present arguments to Germany which she would not otherwise have.

Continuing, the Prime Minister said that he had from the beginning been very attracted by the prospect of action against the Narvik traffic, and he had not been unduly disturbed by the probable reactions of Norway except in respect of two points:-

- (i) It had been suggested that one of the results might be that the Norwegians would cut off the export of ore to us. This might well involve the shutting down of some of our own blast furnaces and a consequent reduction in our munitions production. This was a new factor which had only recently come to light.
- (ii) There was a possibility that the Germans might seize bases in southern Norway, and thereby be able to intensify their naval and air attacks on our shipping in the North Sea. This had seemed a rather alarming prospect, but he had been reassured by the Chiefs of Staff's examination of the question from which it appeared that we should be able to take action to forestall the Germans.

The real test of the desirability of action against the Narvik traffic, however, must be its probable effect on the success of the bigger project. On this point he based his views on the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff that at least the passive goodwill of Norway and Sweden was essential, and in particular that of Sweden. It must be recognised that the case on which we should base any action against the Narvik traffic was rather thin. It rested on the sinking of three ships in Norwegian

territorial waters, and two of these cases were contested by Norway. It would be hard, therefore, to show that we were not using this action by Germany as a mere pretext for our own action. But even this consideration was not overwhelming, since it was highly probable that the opinion of the neutral countries as a whole would be determined primarily by the attitude of Sweden. The Swedish attitude was therefore the key to the problem.

He had hoped that M. Wallenberg would bring with him suggestions for action of some sort to restrict the export of ore to Germany, but unfortunately this hope had not been fulfilled. M. Wallenberg had, on the other hand, made it perfectly clear that our proposed action at Narvik would be most distasteful to Sweden for fear of the possible reactions of Germany. So far we had always thought that in the worst case Germany would invade Sweden, but was it not perhaps more likely that she would make an immediate approach to Sweden somewhat on the following lines :-

"You are faced with the prospect of military action by a powerful nation with no regard for neutral countries. Great Britain intends to use a very flimsy pretext to seize the orefields, which are of vital importance to us, and we shall have to take steps to prevent this. We would far rather do this with your permission and consent. Let us therefore send a German force to the minefields. This protection of your resources would be effective against Great Britain, but it would be equally effective against Russia, who must remain a danger to your security."

Suppose the Swedes accepted such an offer. They might say, with some justification, that we had forced them to do so. We should then have lost our whole chance of carrying through the big project

successfully. He was much alarmed at this possibility of our throwing Sweden into the arms of Germany by taking precipitate action now.

It was certainly very trying to wait in apparent inaction, but we had to be sure that any risk that we took would bring us a corresponding return. With these considerations in mind he was not in favour of doing anything now about the Narvik traffic, but on the other hand he was equally not in favour of doing nothing at all. In view of what M. Wallenberg had said, it seemed that the present would be a very good moment to open negotiations with Sweden on a high level, say, through the Lord Privy Seal. His conversations with the Swedish Government might well open the way to securing their active co-operation. With a friendly country on the shores of the Baltic, wide possibilities of offensive action against the enemy would be opened up. In offering to send a Mission to Sweden we should not give the impression that we had abandoned all idea of stopping the Narvik traffic, but we should merely point out that in view of the vital importance of the iron ore question, we were proposing to send a member of the War Cabinet to discuss the whole matter with them. We could not, of course, be sure that this move would be successful, but it seemed to offer a very good prospect of success. On the other hand one false step now would wreck our whole chance of success in the bigger project. In any case, in view of the telegram from Mr. Menzies it would be out of the question to take any immediate action against the Narvik traffic.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR suggested that whoever went to Sweden would have to be in a position to take a very stiff line with the Swedish Government. The matter was one of the greatest urgency to us since the big project seemed to be our only chance of ending the war quickly.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that it would be much easier to take a strong line in personal conversations than in any exchange of diplomatic documents.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS warned the War Cabinet that M. Wallenberg was not a member of the Swedish Government, and it could not therefore be guaranteed that his rather favourable reaction to the suggestion of possible collaboration between the Allies and Sweden would be echoed by the Swedish Government. It might, however, be an indication of the way their minds were working. We must expect that when we proposed the despatch of a Mission to Sweden they would express considerable alarm at the suggestion, and we might have to use the threat of action against the Narvik traffic as a lever to secure their consent. Assistance to Finland could perhaps be used as a cover for the despatch of the Mission. Nevertheless, he would not be at all surprised if von Ribbentrop arrived in Stockholm on the heels of the Minister sent from this country.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY urged that it would be quite apparent to the Germans that the Mission from this country was being sent to discuss the possibility of stopping the export of ore. It would surely be better to take naval action first and then to send our Mission, nominally on the pretext dealing with the protests which would certainly follow. To send a Mission before we did anything at all would be merely to advertise our interest in the iron ore and to direct German attention to it. The Swedes would be thereby emboldened to continue their protests.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS said that he had kept the Dominion High Commissioners in touch with the progress of the War Cabinet's deliberations on the whole question. They had not yet received definite instructions from their Governments but their personal reactions might be summarised as follows:-

There is every justification for taking effective measures to deny ore to Germany if it is clear that this can be effectively carried out and that the stoppage will achieve an early termination of the war. Germany would naturally do her best to safeguard her ore supplies. If she thought that our action would stop at the Narvik traffic, she might not react strongly, but if she thought that this was only a preliminary to action against the Northern ore fields she might invade Southern Sweden with a view to their protection. Before therefore, we took any action against the Narvik traffic we should be quite certain that, if Germany did invade Sweden, we could take adequate counter-measures to prevent Sweden from being overrun. Apparently, however, we can do nothing till the Spring, whereas Germany can at least obtain the foothold in Southern Sweden immediately, which would give her a base for further operations later in the year.

It was clear that the co-operation of Sweden was essential for our success and this could best be obtained by playing upon the natural desire of Sweden to help Finland. It was of paramount importance to maintain Finnish resistance to Russia and the only base through which assistance could be provided was Sweden. If we forced Sweden prematurely into hostilities with Germany, we should lose this base.

A further consideration was the possibility of Norway defending the neutrality of her Territorial Waters against us by force. Should we give way before Norwegian opposition or should we take extreme measures against her warships? If we did the latter we should have to face great resentment in all neutral countries throughout the world, and in particular in Sweden.

In short there was a grave risk of action against the Narvik traffic alienating Sweden, which would be a major misfortune. The result on Germany of stopping the Narvik traffic alone would not justify taking this risk.

THE MINISTER FOR CO-ORDINATION OF DEFENCE said that before deciding to give up the idea of stopping the Narvik traffic he would like to be assured by the Chiefs of Staff that we could in fact carry out successfully the task of seizing the Northern mine fields.

The co-operation of Norway and Sweden was essential to us if we were to lend support to Finland. If there was a continuous flow of assistance to Finland through these countries they would be brought into the war atmosphere and there seemed every prospect that public opinion of Scandinavia would be won over to co-operating with the Allies. The threat of a German invasion of Sweden would also help to turn opinion in Sweden in our favour. The Swedes knew perfectly well that the Germans were in fact making preparations for an oversea expedition.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that assistance to Finland would be one of the best ways of bringing Sweden's opinion over to our side. He did not greatly fear the result of the Germans sending Ribbentrop to Stockholm to bid against us. It was clear that the weight of public opinion in Sweden was already in favour of the Allies.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY pointed out that we should be asking the Swedes to fight for us, whereas the Germans would only be pressing them to remain neutral. The Swedish Government was therefore more likely to listen to Germany than to us. Moreover, it was significant that Germany was supplying Sweden with

munitions to replace those which were being sent to Finland. Sweden would be very loth to have this supply cut off.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL said that he had always hoped that it would be possible to stop the Narvik traffic, and he felt that the Scandinavian people would be tremendously impressed by the effect of strong action. He had been surprised to find that M. Wallenberg had made no proposals for co-operating with us in reducing supplies to Germany. Before any Minister was sent to Sweden he thought we ought to make up our minds:-

- (a) not to withdraw the threat of action against the Narvik traffic,
- (b) to be prepared, if necessary, to put this threat into effect, and
- (c) how far we were prepared to go if Sweden refused to co-operate at all. For example, were we prepared in the last resort to go into Sweden and seize the Northern mine fields by force? //

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER expressed his disappointment that a project, which at first sight had seemed to provide such a promising opportunity for breaking the chain of inaction, had been shown on examination to be fraught with such grave disadvantages. He had always felt sure that the Swedes would react most unfavourably when we told them that we proposed to carry out the Narvik project. The real point, of course, was to estimate the Swedish reactions after we had carried out the project. He asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he felt able to put forward any views on this point.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS thought that Swedish action would ultimately depend upon Russia's progress against Finland. If the threat from Russia became intensified, no doubt Sweden would be very ready to ask for our aid. Public opinion would be behind any such call. But it would be a very different matter if we took action when public opinion was running strongly against us. In his view on the larger project success would be with Swedish co-operation.

"THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO thought that the War Cabinet had always anticipated a severe reaction from Norway and Sweden when we informed them of our intentions. He himself had discounted this beforehand. He had thought, however, that such reactions would be short-lived as, even after carrying out the Narvik project, we should be co-operating with both countries in the defence of Sweden, which would bring us together. The Swedish Memorandum was no stronger than he had anticipated. He did not see the smallest prospect of Sweden being willing to discuss the larger project at present. They were much too apprehensive of Germany. As long as the Finnish front held, the Swedes would make no move in our direction. If the Lord Privy Seal went to Sweden, he would have an extremely difficult task. He would have to be in a position to reassure the Swedes that the Allies could give them sufficient help, in the event of a collapse of the Finnish front, to resist attack both by Russia and Germany."

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL felt that a very great strain would be placed upon Finnish resistance in May.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY had no doubt in his mind how Sweden would react to the suggestion of our sending a member of the War Cabinet to discuss matters. The Scandinavian countries were dominated by fear, and when they saw that we had dropped our project as a result of their protests, they would resist the suggested visit with redoubled vigour.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR thought that we should still hold out the threat of the Narvik operation and should continue by all means in our power to urge the Swedes towards a more accommodating attitude.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR said that he had seen a great deal of M. Wallenberg in the course of recent trade discussions. M. Wallenberg was strongly pro-British and in favour of Sweden's eventual active intervention on the side of the Allies, but he was conscious of her great military weakness. In his (the Secretary of State for War's) opinion, the best course would be to wait on the development of the Russo-Finnish war and meanwhile to impress Sweden with the help which the Allies could give her. He doubted the advisability of sending a Mission to Sweden at the present moment, and suggested that a less obvious line of communication should be used.

THE PRIME MINISTER felt that our point of view could be put to the Swedes with much more force by a Mission than through the diplomatic representation, and he thought that the possibility of a Minister going to Sweden should be fully explored.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY pointed out that a flotilla could be sent in the teeth of a protest, but not a Mission. He was, however, prepared to accept the views which had been expressed by his colleagues. He had, himself, been strongly in favour of carrying out the Narvik project, but in view of the opinions which had been expressed by his colleagues and of the evident necessity to carry the Dominions with us in any decision, he did not propose to pursue the matter further. He wished, however, to emphasise one point. Up to the present he had felt that time was on our side, but he was not sure that this would continue to be so. We had hoped that our Air Force would gradually overhaul that of Germany; but was it certain that after six months of war we should, in fact, have improved our position in this respect?

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the French air strength must be taken into account with our own.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR said that so many factors were involved that he would like time to consider his reply.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY emphasised that Germany's central position enabled her to deliver threats in several directions. We might well have a much graver situation ahead of us and we must redouble our efforts to guard against it.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he agreed with the warning tone of the First Lord's remarks. He suggested that the Chiefs of Staff should examine the possibility of capturing the ore fields in the face of Norwegian and Swedish opposition.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS observed that whatever the Chiefs of Staff might say as to the practicability of such operations, on military grounds, he personally was unable to contemplate war with Norway to capture Narvik.

Continuing, he suggested that he and the Lord Privy Seal should discuss the question of sending a Mission to Sweden and report to the War Cabinet.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY suggested that if we could impress on the Swedes our ability to capture the fields, they might be prepared to sabotage the mines themselves, or to let us sabotage them. This would have the desired effect as far as we were concerned.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL suggested that as the first step we might suggest buying the mines.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR thought that the Swedes would be too much afraid of Germany's reactions to agree to sell the mines.

The War Cabinet -

- (i) Decided that no action should be taken for the time being to stop the traffic between Germany and Narvik by sending a Flotilla into Norwegian territorial waters:

In reaching this decision the War Cabinet were impressed by the risk that action at the present juncture in stopping the Narvik traffic in Norwegian territorial waters might imperil the success of the larger project, i.e., the complete stoppage of supplies to Germany from the Northern orefields:

- (ii) Agreed that no indication should be given to the Norwegian and Swedish Governments of the decision reached under (i) above, and that these Governments should be left under the impression that we still contemplated action to stop this traffic:
- (iii) Invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Lord Privy Seal to consider the question of sending to Scandinavia a Mission headed by a member of the War Cabinet, and to report orally to the War Cabinet.
- (iv) Invited the Chiefs of Staff to consider the possibility of capturing the Galivare orefields in the face of Norwegian and Swedish opposition. If it was thought a practicable operation, what forces would it involve?

Richmond Terrace, S.W.1.,

12th January, 1940.